Abstract. We take a critical look at the relationship between the security of cryptographic schemes in the Random Oracle Model, and the security of the schemes that result from implementing the random oracle by so called "cryptographic hash functions".
Introduction
A popular methodology for designing cryptographic protocols consists of the following two steps. One first designs an ideal system in which all parties (including the adversary) have oracle access to a truly random function, and proves the security of this ideal system. Next, one replaces the random oracle by a "good cryptographic hashing function" (such as MD5 or SHA), providing all parties (including the adversary) with a succinct description of this function. Thus, one obtains an implementation of the ideal system in a "real-world" where random oracles do not exist. This methodology, explicitly formulated by Bellare and Rogaway [1993] and hereafter referred to as the random oracle methodology, has been used in many works (see, e.g., Fiat and Shamir [1986] , Schnorr [1991] , Guillou and Quisquater [1988] , Okamoto [1992] , Rogaway [1993, 1996] , Micali [2000] , and Pointcheval and Stern [1996] ).
Although the random oracle methodology seems to be useful in practice, it is unclear how to put this methodology on firm grounds. One can indeed make clear statements regarding the security of the ideal system, but it is not clear what happens when one replaces the random oracle by a "fully specified implementation". What one would have liked is a realizable construct that, when used to replace the random oracle, maintains the security of the ideal scheme. The purpose of this work is to point out fundamental difficulties in proceeding toward this goal.
We demonstrate that the traditional approach of providing a single robust definition that supports a wide range of applications is bound to fail. That is, one cannot expect to see definitions such as of pseudorandom generators or functions [Yao 1982; Blum and Micali 1984; Goldreich et al. 1986] , and general results of the type saying that these can be used in any application in which parties are restricted merely by computing resources. Specifically, we identify a specific property of the random oracle, that seems to capture one aspect of the random oracle methodology (and in particular seems to underline heuristics such as the Fiat-Shamir transformation of a three-round identification scheme into a signature scheme [Fiat and Shamir 1986] ). We show that even a minimalistic formulation of this property, called correlation intractability, cannot be obtained by any "fully specified implementation".
To demonstrate the implications of the above to the security of cryptographic systems, we show that systems whose security relies on the "correlation intractability" of their oracle may be secure in the Random Oracle Model, and yet be insecure when implemented using any fully specified function (or function ensemble). In particular, we describe schemes for digital signatures and public-key encryption that are secure in the Random Oracle Model, but for which any implementation yields insecure schemes.
1.1. THE SETTING. For the purpose of the following discussion, a cryptographic system consists of a set of parties, which are modeled by probabilistic polynomial time interactive Turing machines. A cryptographic application comes with a security requirement specifying the adversary's abilities and when the latter is considered successful. The abilities of the adversary include its computational power (typically, an arbitrary polynomial-time machine) and the ways in which it can interact with the other parties. The success of the adversary is defined by means of a predetermined polynomial-time predicate of the application's global view. (The application's global view consists of the initial inputs of all the parties and of the adversary, their internal coin tosses, and all the messages that were exchanged among them.) A system is considered secure if any adversary with the given abilities has only a negligible probability of success (or, in some cases, only a negligible advantage over a "trivial attack").
1.1.1. The Random Oracle Model. In a scheme that operates in the Random Oracle Model, all parties (including the adversary) interact with one another as usual interactive machines, but in addition they can make oracle queries. It is postulated that all oracle queries, regardless of the identity of the party making them, are answered by a single function, denoted O, that is uniformly selected among all possible functions. The set of possible functions is determined by a length function, out (·) , and by the security parameter of the system. Specifically, given security parameter k we consider functions mapping {0, 1}
* to {0, 1} out (k) . A set of interactive oracle machines as above corresponds to an ideal system for one specific application. Security of an ideal system is defined as usual. That is, an ideal system is considered secure if any adversary with the given abilities (including oracle access) has only a negligible probability of success (or only a negligible advantage). Here the probability is taken also over the choices of the random oracle.
1.1.2. Implementing an Ideal System. Since most real-world systems do not have access to a random oracle, there is a need to "implement" the random oracle aspect of the ideal systems from above. The soundness of the random oracle methodology depends on finding a suitable notion of implementation, such that whenever the ideal system is secure in the Random Oracle Model, the implementation will be secure in the standard model. Furthermore, the implementation should be directly available (i.e., fully specified) to each party. 1 However, all the notions that we consider in this work fail poorly at this challenge.
Loosely speaking, by "implementing" a particular ideal system we mean using an easy-to-evaluate function f instead of the random oracle. That is, whenever the ideal system queries the oracle with a value x, the implementation instead evaluates f (x). In this work, we examine three formalizations of this notion. First, we briefly examine (and discard of) the notion of implementation by a single function. Then we discuss implementation by a function ensemble, which is the notion we use through most of the article. Finally, we discuss a more stringent notion, where the functions in the ensemble can only be evaluated on inputs of a predetermined (short) length.
1.1.2.1. Implementation by a Single Function. This is perhaps the most "natural" notion, in that it corresponds to the common practice of using a fixed function (e.g., SHA-1) to replace the oracle. Here, an ideal system (for some specific application), , is transformed into a real system (for the same application) by transforming each interactive oracle machine, into a standard interactive machine in the natural manner. That is, each oracle call is replaced by the evaluation of a fixed function f on the corresponding query. 2 The above system is called an implementation of using function f . The adversary, attacking this implementation, may mimic the behavior of the adversary 1 One implementation that is clearly sound, is to replace the random function by a pseudorandom one, whose seed remains secret. (Presumably, for this to work there should be an online trusted party who knows the seed and can evaluate the function.) However, this implementation is not fully specified (i.e., it is not directly available to the users). We stress that the random oracle methodology is typically applied in settings where we need a fully specified implementation that the parties can evaluate on their own. 2 Formally, the function f also takes as input the security parameter k, so that the function f (k, ·) maps {0, 1}
* to {0, 1} out (k) .
of the ideal system, by evaluating f at arguments of its choice, but it may also do other things. In particular, it may obtain some global insight into the structure of the function f , and use this insight toward its vicious goals. An implementation is called secure if any adversary attacking it may succeed only with negligible probability, where the success event is defined exactly as in the ideal system (i.e., it is defined by the same polynomial-time computable predicate of the application's global view). Using this notion of an implementation, we would like to say that a function f is a "good implementation of a random oracle" if for any ideal system , security of implies security of the implementation of using f . It is very easy to see, however, that no (single) polynomial-time computable function can provide a good implementation of a random oracle. Consider, for example, a candidate function f . Then, a (contrived) application for which f does not provide a good implementation consists of an oracle machine (representing an honest party) that upon receiving a message m, makes query m to the oracle and reveals its private input if the oracle answers with f (m). Suppose that the adversary is deemed successful whenever the honest party reveals its private input. Clearly, this ideal system is secure (in the Random Oracle Model), since the random oracle will return the value f (m) only with negligible probability; however, its implementation using f is certainly not secure.
One should not be surprised by the failure of the single-function notion of implementation. Indeed, this notion fails even to be collision intractable (e.g., it definitely fails with respect to nonuniform polynomial-size circuits), whereas a random oracle is definitely collision-intractable, even with respect to nonuniform polynomial-size circuits. Indeed, a collision-intractable function is typically modeled not as a single function, but rather as a collection (or ensemble) of functions, where a function is chosen at random from the ensemble and made public once and for all. We thus turn our attention to possible corresponding implementations of the random oracle by function ensembles.
1.1.2.2. Implementation by a Function Ensemble. In this setting, we have a "system set-up" phase, in which the function is selected once and for all, and its description is available to all parties.
3 After the set-up phase, this function is used in place of the random oracle just as above. A little more precisely, we consider a function ensemble F = {F k |k ∈ N}, where
such that there exists a polynomial time algorithm that, on input s and x, returns f s (x). Just like the random oracle, the ensemble's functions are defined for any input length, although any user and (feasible) adversary will only invoke them on inputs of length bounded by a polynomial in their description length, |s|. (Indeed, protocols in the random oracle model often assume that the random oracle is defined for all input lengths.) The implementation of an ideal system, , by the function ensemble F is obtained as follows. On security parameter k, we uniformly select s ∈ {0, 1} k , and make s available to all parties including the adversary. Given this initialization phase, we replace each oracle call of an interactive oracle machine by the evaluation of the function f s on the corresponding query. The resulting system is called an implementation of using function ensemble F.
Again, the adversary may mimic the behavior of the adversary in the Random Oracle Model by evaluating f s at arguments of its choice, but it can also use its knowledge of the description of f s in any arbitrary way. Such a real system is called secure if any adversary attacking it has only a negligible probability of success, where the probability is taken over the random choice of s as well as the coins of all the parties. As before, we would like to say that an ensemble F provides a "good implementation of a random oracle" if for every ideal system , if is secure then so is the implementation of using F. Notice that in this case, the contrived example from above does not work anymore, since the success event must be independent of the random choice of s. Nonetheless, this work implies that no function ensemble can provide a good implementation of a random oracle.
Restricted Function Ensembles and Other Notions.
Although the above notions seem like the most "natural" ways of defining an implementation of the random oracle (and they correspond to the common practice of using a so called "cryptographic hash function" to replace the oracle), there still may be other interesting notions. One such example is the notion of function ensembles that are defined over finite domains. That is, instead of considering functions of the form f s : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} out (|s|) , one may consider functions of the form f s : {0, 1} in (|s|) → {0, 1} out (|s|) . Furthermore, the function description (i.e., s) may be longer than the input and output lengths (i.e., in (|s|) and out (|s|)). Note that syntactically, such function ensembles can only "implement" a similarlyrestricted random oracle (i.e., O : {0, 1} in (k) → {0, 1} out (k) ). Furthermore, most of our negative results hold also with respect to such restricted "implementations" (see Section 5).
1.2. OUR RESULTS. The main results in this paper refer to the notion of implementing a variable input-length oracle by a function ensemble (of functions with variable input-length as in Eq. (1)). Thus, unless we explicitly say otherwise, when we talk about implementing the Random Oracle Model by function ensembles we refer to this notion.
1.2.1. Correlation Intractability. One property we certainly expect from a good implementation of a random oracle, is that it should be infeasible to find inputs to the function that stand in some "rare" relationship with the corresponding outputs. Indeed, many applications of the random-oracle methodology (such as the FiatShamir heuristic) assume that it is infeasible to find input-output pairs that stand in a particular relations induced by the application. Trying to formulate this property, we may require that given the description of the function, it is hard to find a sequence of pre-images that together with their images (under this function) satisfy some given relation. Clearly, this can only hold for relations for which finding such sequences is hard in the Random Oracle Model. That is, IF it is hard to find a sequence of pre-images that together with their images under a random oracle satisfy relation R, THEN given the description of a "good" function f s it should be hard to find a sequence of pre-images that together with their images under f s satisfy R.
In most of this work, we mainly consider the task of finding a single pre-image that together with its image satisfies some property. (The case of relations with larger arity is discussed in Section 5, in connection with restricted ensembles.) Loosely speaking, a binary relation is called evasive if when given access to a random oracle O, it is infeasible to find a string x so that the pair (x, O(x) ) is in the relation. (For instance, the relation {(x, 0 out (k) ) : x ∈ {0, 1} * } is evasive. The relation {(x, 0y) : x ∈ {0, 1} * , y ∈ {0, 1} out (k)−1 } is not.) A function ensemble F is called correlation intractable if for every evasive binary relation, given the description of a uniformly selected function f s ∈ F k it is infeasible to find an x such that (x, f s (x)) is in the relation. 4 We show that INFORMAL THEOREM 1.1. There exist no correlation intractable function ensembles.
1.2.1.1. Restricted Correlation Intractability. The proof of the above negative result relies on the fact that the description of the function is shorter than the input used in the attack. Thus, we also investigate (in Section 5) the case where one restricts the function f s to inputs whose length is less than the length of s. We show that the negative result can be extended to the case where the function description is shorter than the sum of the lengths of the input and output of the function. Furthermore, when one considers the notion of correlation intractability for relations on sequences of inputs and outputs, then the negative result holds as long as the total length of all the inputs and outputs is more than the length of the function description.
Our results still leave open the possibility that there exist function ensembles that are correlation intractable with respect to input-output sequences of total a priori bounded length. However, such ensembles may be useful only in applications where the number of invocations of the cryptosystem is a priori bounded (or where the security of the system depends only on an a priori bounded partial history of invocations). 5 1.2.2. Failures of the Random Oracle Methodology. Upon formulating the random oracle methodology, Bellare and Rogaway did warn that a proof of security in the Random Oracle Model should not be taken as guarantee to the security of implementations (in which the Random Oracle is replaced by functions such as MD5). However, it was widely believed that a security proof in the Random Oracle Model means that there are no "structural flaws" in the scheme. That is, it was believed that any attack against an implementation of this scheme must take advantage of some "specific flaws in the implementation". A related common belief was that 4 The more general notion is that of correlation intractability with respect to multiple input-output pairs. The above notion that only talks about one pair should really be called "1-input" correlation intractability. Still, in this article, we omit the 1-input qualifiers for ease of presentation. The fact that the following (negative) result refers even to 1-input correlation intractability only makes it stronger. 5 We note that the Fiat-Shamir heuristic for transforming interactive identification protocols into signature schemes does not fall into the above category, since the function's seed needs to be fixed with the public key, and used for signing polynomially many messages, where the polynomial is not a priori known. The encryption and signature schemes presented to prove Theorem 1.2 are "unnatural". We do not suggest that a statement as above holds with respect to schemes presented in the literature. Still, the lesson is that the mere fact that a scheme is secure in the Random Oracle Model does not necessarily imply that a particular implementation of it (in the real world) is secure, or even that this ideal scheme has any secure implementation at all. In fact, our techniques are quite general and can be applied to practically any cryptographic application. That is, given an ideal cryptographic application A, we can construct an ideal cryptographic application A such that A is just as secure as A (in the Random Oracle Model), but A has no secure implementation.
1.2.2.1. An Afterthought. Trying to explain our negative results, we note that the beliefs reviewed before Theorem 1.2 seem to assume that the only "reasonable thing" that a generic attack can do with a description of the function implementing the oracle, is to invoke it on inputs of its choice. This oversight, which can be traced to the conjectured difficulty of "reverse engineering", ignores the computational theoretic fact that a code of a program (or part of it) can be fed to the program itself resulting in "unexpected" behavior. Indeed, this is essentially what our "generic attacker" does. In retrospect, several subsequent works (e.g., Barak et al. [2001] and Barak [2001 Barak [ , 2002 ) demonstrated that having a description of a function is much more powerful than just having a black-box access to that function.
1.3. TECHNIQUES. Our proof of Theorem 1.2 uses in an essential way noninteractive CS-proofs (in the Random Oracle Model), as defined and constructed by Micali [2000] . 6 Interestingly, we only use the fact that non-interactive CS-proofs exist in the Random Oracle Model, and do not care whether or not these ideal CSproofs have an implementation using function ensembles (nor if noninteractive CS-proofs exists at all outside of the Random Oracle Model). Specifically, CSproofs are used to "effectively verify" any polynomial-time verifiable statement within time that is bounded by one fixed polynomial. Furthermore, we use the fact that the definition of CS-proofs guarantees that the complexity of generating such proofs is polynomial in the time required for ordinary verification. See further discussion in Section 2.2.
1.4. RELATED WORK.
1.4.1. Previous Work.
1.4.1.1. Correlation Intractability. Our definition of correlation-intractability is related to a definition by Okamoto [1992] . Using our terminology, Okamoto considers function ensembles for which it is infeasible to form input-output relations with respect to a specific evasive relation [Okamoto 1992, Def. 19] (rather than all such relations). He uses the assumption that such function ensembles exists, for a specific evasive relation in Okamoto [1992, Thm. 20 ].
1.4.1.1. Special-Purpose Properties of the Random Oracle Model. First steps in the direction of identifying and studying useful special-purpose properties of the Random Oracle Model have been taken by Canetti [1997] . Specifically, Canetti considered a property called "perfect one-wayness", provided a definition of this property, constructions that possess this property (under some reasonable assumptions), and applications for which such functions suffice. Additional constructions have been suggested by Canetti et al. [1998b] . Another context where specific properties of the random oracle where captured and realized is the signature scheme of Gennaro et al. [1999] .
1.4.2. Subsequent Work. All works surveyed in this subsection have appeared following the preliminary version of the current work [Canetti et al. 1998a ].
1.4.2.1. Relation to Zero-Knowledge Proofs. Hada and Tanaka [1999] observed that the existence of even restricted correlation intractable functions (in the nonuniform model) would be enough to prove that 3-round auxiliary-input zero-knowledge AM proof systems only exist for languages in BPP. (Recall that auxiliary-input zero-knowledge is seemingly weaker than black-box zero-knowledge, and so the result of Hada and Tanaka [1999] is incomparable to prior work of Goldreich and Krawczyk [1996] that showed that constant-round auxiliary-input zero-knowledge AM proof systems only exist for languages in BPP.) 1.4.2.2. Relation to "Magic Functions". Following Hada and Tanaka [1999] , Dwork et al. [2003] investigated the notion of "magic functions", which is related to our correlation intractable functions. Like correlation intractability, the definition of "magic functions" is motivated by the quest to capture the properties that are required from the hash function in the Fiat-Shamir heuristic. Correlation intractability seems like a general and natural property, but is not known to be either necessary or sufficient for the Fiat-Shamir heuristic (which is a special case of the random oracle methodology). In contrast, "magic functions" are explicitly defined as "functions that make the Fiat-Shamir heuristic work". In their paper, Dwork et al. [2003] demonstrated a relation between "magic functions" and 3-round zero-knowledge, similar to the relation between correlation intractability and zero-knowledge exhibited in Hada and Tanaka [1999] . Specifically, they showed that the existence of "magic functions" implies the nonexistence of some kind of 3-round zero-knowledge proof systems, as well as a weakened version of a converse theorem. Barak et al. [2001] imply that a natural method of obtaining adequate function ensembles fails to yield secure implementations for any protocol that is secure in the random oracle model. Specifically, the method shown to fail is applying any "code obfuscator" (i.e., a transformation that changes the programs code without changing its functionality) to an ensemble of pseudorandom functions (i.e., an ensemble of functions that cannot be distinguished from a random oracle when only given oracle access to the function [Goldreich et al. 1986] Barak 2001; Barak 2002] . In particular, Barak et al. [2001] use the code of a program in order to guide a corresponding computation with encrypted intermediate results. Barak [2001 Barak [ , 2002 shows that the code of an adversary can be used to generate certain simulated transcripts that are indistinguishable from the real execution (whereas these specific transcripts cannot be generated while only using oracle access to the adversary's program). Needless to say, none of these work "reverse engineers" the code in any natural sense (i.e., there is no attempt to "understand" or "interpret" the code). Rather, they only use the fact that such a short code exists. Nielsen [2002] shows that there are natural cryptographic tasks that can be securely realized in the Random Oracle Model, but cannot be securely realized in the standard model without a random oracle. (The task considered by Nielsen is non-committing encryption a la Canetti et al. [1996] .) Note that Nielsen's result is more general that Theorem 1.2 in two ways. Firstly, Nielsen refers to a (natural) task rather than to a specific protocol that securely implements it in the Random Oracle Model. Secondly, Nielsen rules out any implementation of the task in the standard model, rather than only ruling out implementations resulting by replacing oracle calls (to the random oracle) by function evaluations (for a function selected at random in a function ensemble). Analogously, our Theorem 1.1 can be viewed as asserting that there exists a natural tool (i.e., correlation intractable functions) that can be securely implemented in the Random Oracle Model but not in the standard model. 1.5. ORGANIZATION. Section 2 presents syntax necessary for the rest of the paper as well as review the definition of CS-proofs. Section 3 discusses the reasoning that led us to define the correlation intractability property, and prove that even such a minimalistic definition cannot be met by function ensembles. Section 4 presents our main negative results-demonstrating the existence of secure ideal signature and encryption schemes that do not have secure implementations. In Section 5, we extend these negative results (in some cases) to ensembles with length restrictions. Also in that section, we discuss the margins to which we could not extend these negative results, and hint on some other possible directions that one may explore in the face of these negative results. In Section 6, we present three different perspectives on the results in this paper, and discuss some directions for future research.
Preliminaries
We consider probability spaces defined over executions of probabilistic machines. Typically, we consider the probability that an output generated by one machine M 1 satisfies a condition that involves the execution of a second machine M 2 . For example, we denote by Pr[y ← M 1 (x) , |y| = |x| & M 2 (y) = 1] the probability that on input x, machine M 1 outputs a string that has length |x| and is accepted by machine M 2 . That is, y in the above notation represents a random variable that may be assigned arbitrary values in {0, 1} * , conditions are made regarding this y, and we consider the probability that these conditions are satisfied when y is distributed according to M 1 (x).
FUNCTION ENSEMBLES.
To make the discussion in the Introduction more precise, we explicitly associate a length function, out : N → N, with the output of the random oracle and its candidate implementations. We usually assume that the length functions are super-logarithmic and polynomially bounded (i.e., ω(log k) ≤ out (k) ≤ poly(k)). We refer to an oracle with length function out as an out -oracle. On security parameter k, each answer of the oracle is a string of length out (k). A candidate implementation of a random out -oracle is an out -ensemble as defined below.
Definition 2.1 (Function Ensembles). Let out : N → N be a length function. An out -ensemble is a sequence F = {F k } k∈N of families of functions,
so that the following holds
Length Requirement. For every s ∈ {0, 1} k and every x ∈ {0, 1}
Efficiency Requirement. There exists a polynomial-time algorithm EVAL so that for every s, x ∈ {0, 1} * , it holds that EVAL(s, x) = f s (x).
In the sequel, we often call s the description or the seed of the function f s .
Remark 2.2. The length of the seed in the above definition serves as a "security parameter" and is meant to control the "quality" of the implementation. It is important to note that although f s (·) is syntactically defined on every input, in a cryptographic applications it is only used on inputs of length at most poly(|s|). (Typically, the exact polynomial depends on the application in which this function ensemble is used.) We stress that all results presented in this article refer to such usage.
Remark 2.3. One may even envision applications in which a more stringent condition on the use of f s holds. Specifically, one may require that the function f s be only applied to inputs of length at most in (|s|), where in : N → N is a specific length function (e.g., in (k) = 2k). We discuss the effects of making such a stringent requirement in Section 5.
CS PROOFS.
Our construction of signature and encryption schemes that are secure in the Random Oracle Model but not in the "real world" uses CS-proofs as defined and constructed by Micali [2000] . Below, we briefly recall the relevant definitions and results.
A CS-proof system consists of a prover, PRV, that is trying to convince a verifier, VER, of the validity of an assertion of the type machine M accepts input x within t steps.
7 A central feature of CS-proofs is that the running-time of the prover on input x is (polynomially) related to the actual running time of M(x) rather than to the global upper bound t; furthermore, the verifier's running-time is polylogarithmic related to t. (These conditions are expressed in the additional efficiency requirements in Definition 2.4 below.)
In our context, we use noninteractive CS-proofs that work in the Random Oracle Model; that is, both prover and verifier have access to a common random oracle. The prover generates an alleged proof that is examined by the verifier. A construction for such CS-proofs was presented by Micali [2000] , using ideas that can be traced to the construction of Kilian [1992] , and requires no computational assumptions. Following is the formulation of CS-proofs, as defined by Micali. In the formulation below, the security parameter k is presented in unary to both parties, whereas the global time bound t is presented in unary to the prover and in binary to the verifier. This allows the (polynomial-time) prover to run in time polynomial in t, whereas the (polynomial-time) verifier may only run in time that is poly-logarithmic in t. (Observe that it is not required that t is bounded above by a polynomial in |x|. In fact, in our arguments, we shall use a slightly superpolynomial function t (i.e., t(n) = n log n ).) Finally, we mention that both the prover and the verifier in the definition below are required to be deterministic machines. See some discussion in Remark 2.6 below.
Definition 2.4 (Noninteractive CS Proofs in the Random Oracle Model).
A CS-proof system consists of two (deterministic) polynomial-time oracle machines, a prover PRV and a verifier VER, operating as follows:
and access to an oracle O, the prover computes a proof
, with t encoded in binary, and access to O, the verifier decides whether to accept or reject the proof π (i.e., VER
The proof system satisfies the following conditions, where the probabilities are taken over the random choice of the oracle O:
Perfect Completeness. For any M, x, t such that machine M accepts the string x within t steps, and for any k,
Computational Soundness. For any polynomial time oracle machine BAD and
Additional Efficiency Conditions; 8 The running-time of the prover PRV on input (1 k , M , x, 1 t ) is (polynomially) related to the actual running time of M(x), rather than to the global upper bound t. That is, there exists a fixed polynomial p(·), such that
where T A (x) denotes the running time of machine A on input x.
Remark 2.5 (Oracle Output Length).
The above definition does not specify the output length of the oracle (i.e., the length of the answers to the oracle queries). In some cases it is convenient to identify this output length with the security parameter, but in many case we do not follow this convention (e.g., in Proposition 2.8 below). In any case, it is trivial to implement an oracle with one output length given an oracle with different output length, so we allow ourselves to ignore this issue.
Remark 2.6 (Deterministic Verifier). Recall that Definition 2.4 mandates that both the prover and verifier are deterministic. Indeed this deviates from the tradition (in this area) of allowing the verifier to be probabilistic; but Micali's construction (in the Random Oracle Model) happens to employ a deterministic verifier (cf. Micali [2000] ). This issue is not essential to our main results, but plays an important role in the proof of Proposition 5.8 (due to K. Nissim). We note that when working in the Random Oracle Model (and only caring about completeness and soundness), one may assume without loss of generality that the prover is deterministic (because it can obtain adequate randomness by querying the oracle). This does not hold with respect to the verifier, since its coin tosses may need to be unknown to the prover.
THEOREM 2.7 ([MICALI 2000]). There exists a noninteractive CS proof system in the Random Oracle Model.
For the proof of our construction (Theorem 4.4), we need a different soundness condition than the one from above. Specifically, we need to make sure that given the machine M (and the complexity bound t), it is hard to find any pair (x, π) such that M does not accept x within t steps and yet VER will accept π as a valid CS-proof to the contrary. One way to obtain this soundness property from the original one, is by postulating that when the verifier is given a proof for an assertion w = ( M , x, t), it uses security parameter k + |w| (rather than just k). Using a straightforward counting argument, we get: PROPOSITION 2.8. Let (PRV, VER) be a CS proof system. Then for every polynomial time oracle machine BAD, there exists a polynomial q(·), such that for every 8 By the above, the running time of PRV on input (1 k , M , x, 1 t ) is at most poly(k, | M |, |x|, t), whereas the running time of VER on input (1 k , M , x, t, π) is at most poly(k, | M |, |x|, |π |, log t). The additional efficiency condition provides even lower running time bound for the prover. Note that if M runs for much less time than t, the prover may not even have enough time to read its entire input.
k it holds that
bad (k) def = Pr O   (w, π) ← BAD O (1 k ), where w = ( M , x,
t), such that machine M does not accept x within t steps and yet VER
O (1 k+|w| , w, π) = accept   ≤ q(k) 2 k .
Correlation Intractability
In this section, we present and discuss the difficulty of defining the intuitive requirement that a function ensemble "behaves like a random oracle" even when its description is given. We first comment that an "obvious over-reaching definition", which amount to adopting the pseudorandom requirement of Goldreich et al. [1986] , fails poorly. That is, we cannot require that an (efficient) algorithm that is given the description of the function cannot distinguish its input-output behavior from the one of a random function, because the function description determines its input-output behavior.
3.1. TOWARD A DEFINITION. Although we cannot require the value of a fully specified function to be "random", we may still be able to require that it has some "unpredictability properties". For example, we may require that, given a description of a family and a function chosen at random from a this family, it is hard to find two pre-images that the function maps to the same image. Indeed, this sound definition coincides with the well-known collision-intractability property [Damgård 1987 ].
Trying to generalize, we may replace the "equality of images" relation by any other relation among the pre-images and images of the function. Namely, we would like to say that an ensemble is correlation intractable if for any relation, given the description of a randomly chosen function, it is infeasible to find a sequence of pre-images that together with their images satisfy this relation.
This requirement, however, is still unreasonably strong since there are relations that are easy to satisfy even in the Random Oracle Model. We therefore restrict the above infeasibility requirement by saying that it holds only with respect to relations that are hard to satisfy in the Random Oracle Model. That is, IF it is hard to find a sequence of pre-images that together with their images under a random function satisfy relation R, THEN given the description of a randomly chosen function f s it should be hard to find a sequence of pre-images that together with their images under f s satisfy R.
This seems to be a minimalistic notion of correlation intractable ensemble of functions, yet we show below that no ensemble can satisfy it. In fact, in the definition below we only consider the task of finding a single pre-image that together with its image satisfies some property. Namely, instead of considering all possible relations, we only consider binary ones. Since we are showing impossibility result, this syntactic restriction only strengthens the result. (When we consider restricted ensembles in Section 5, we will revisit the case of relations with larger arity.) 3.2. ACTUAL DEFINITIONS. We start with a formal definition of a relation that is hard to satisfy in the random oracle model.
Definition 3.1 (Evasive Binary Relations).
A binary relation R is said to be evasive with respect to length function out if for any probabilistic polynomial time oracle machine M there is a negligible function 9 negl such that
where O : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} out (k) is a uniformly chosen function.
A special case of evasive relations consists of R's for which there exists a negligible function negl(·) so that for all k
(All the binary relations used in the sequel falls into this category.) The reason such an R is evasive is that any oracle machine, M, making at most poly(k) queries to a random O satisfies
We are now ready to state our minimalistic definition of a correlation intractable ensemble:
Definition 3.2 (Correlation Intractability). Let out : N → N be length function, and let F be an out -ensemble.
-Let R ⊆ {0, 1} * × {0, 1} * be a binary relation. We say that F is correlation intractable with respect to R if for every probabilistic polynomial-time machine M there is a negligible function negl such that
where the probability is taken over the choice of s ∈ {0, 1} k and the coins of M. -We say that F is correlation intractable, if it is correlation intractable with respect to every evasive binary relation (with respect to out ).
Remark 3.3. In the above definition, we quantify over all evasive binary relations. A weaker notion, called weak correlation intractability, is obtained by quantifying only over all polynomial-time recognizable evasive binary relations (i.e., we only consider those relations R such that there exists a polynomial-time algorithm that, given (x, y), decides whether or not (x, y) ∈ R). In the sequel, we consider both notions.
CORRELATION-INTRACTABLE ENSEMBLES DO NOT EXIST THEOREM 3.4. For any super-logarithmic length function out , there exist no correlation intractable out -ensembles, not even in the weak sense.
Note that in case the length function is logarithmic (i.e., out (k) = O(log k)), there exist no "interesting" evasive binary relations (i.e., for an evasive relation R it must be hard to find x ∈ {0, 1} k such that (x, y) ∈ R for some y). Thus, correlation intractable out -ensembles do exist in this case (of out (k) = O(log k)), but in an uninteresting sense.
PROOF. For any super-logarithmic out , let F = { f s } s∈{0,1} * be an out -ensemble. We define the binary relation:
Clearly, this relation is polynomial-time recognizable, since f s can be computed in polynomial time. Also, the relation is evasive (with respect to out ) since for every x ∈ {0, 1} * there is at most one y ∈ {0, 1} out (k) satisfying (x, y) ∈ R F , 10 and so
On the other hand, consider the machine I that computes the identity function, I (x) = x for all x. It violates the correlation intractability requirement, since for all k,
In fact, since R F is polynomial-time recognizable, even the weak correlation intractability of F is violated.
Failures of the Random Oracle Methodology
This section demonstrates that the security of a cryptographic scheme in the Random Oracle Model does not always imply its security under some specific choice of a "good hash function" that is used to implement the random oracle. To prove this statement we construct signature and encryption schemes that are secure in the Random Oracle Model, yet for which any implementation of the random oracle (by a function ensemble) yields insecure schemes. Put in other words, although the ideal scheme is secure, any implementation of it is necessarily insecure.
The underlying idea is to start with a secure scheme (which may or may not use a random oracle) and modify it to get a scheme that is secure in the Random Oracle Model, but such that its security is easily violated when trying to replace the random oracle by any ensemble. This is done by using evasive relations as constructed in Theorem 3.4. The modified scheme starts by trying to find a preimage that together with its image yields a pair in the evasive relation. In case the attempt succeeds, the scheme does something that is clearly insecure (e.g., output the secret key). Otherwise, the scheme behaves as the original (secure) scheme does. The former case (i.e., finding a pair in the relation) will occur rarely in the Random Oracle Model, thus the scheme will maintain its security there. However, it will be easy for an adversary to make sure that the former case always occurs under any implementation of the Random Oracle Model, thus no implementation 10 Such a y exists if and only if out (|x|) = out (k). may be secure. 11 We start with the case of a signature scheme, and present the construction in three steps.
-In the first step, we carry out the above idea in a naive way. This allows us to prove a weaker statement, saying that for any function ensemble F, there exists a signature scheme that is secure in the Random Oracle Model, but is not secure when implemented using F. This, by itself, means that one cannot construct a function ensemble that provides secure implementation of any cryptographic scheme that is secure in the Random Oracle Model. But it still does not rule out the possibility (ruled out below) that for any cryptographic scheme that is secure in the Random Oracle Model there exists a secure implementation (via a different function ensemble). -In the second step, we use diagonalization techniques to reverse the order of quantifiers. Namely, we show that there exists a signature scheme that is secure in the Random Oracle Model, but for which any implementation (using any function ensemble) results in an insecure scheme. However, the scheme constructed in this step utilizes signing and verification procedures that run in (slightly) superpolynomial time. -In the third step, we use CS-proofs [Micali 2000 ] to get rid of the superpolynomial running-time (of the legitimate procedures), hence obtaining a standard signature scheme that is secure in the Random Oracle Model, but has no secure implementation. Specifically, in this step we use CS-proofs as a tool to "diagonalize against all polynomial-time ensembles in polynomial time". (As noted by Silvio Micali, this technique may be useful also in other settings where diagonalization techniques are applied.)
The reader is referred to Goldwasser et al. [1988] for basic terminology regarding signature schemes and corresponding notions of security. As a starting point for our constructions, we use a signature scheme, denoted S = (G, S, V ), where G is the key-generation algorithm, S is the signing algorithm, and V is the verification algorithm. We assume that the scheme (G, S, V ) is existentially unforgeable under adaptive chosen message attack, in the Random Oracle Model. We do not need to rely on any computational assumptions here, since one-way functions are sufficient for constructing secure signature schemes [Naor and Yung 1989; Rompel 1990] , and the random oracle can be used to implement one-way functions without any assumptions. 12 4.1. CONVENTIONS. In the three steps below we assume, without loss of generality, that the security parameter (i.e., k) is implicit in the keys generated by G(1 k ). Also, let us fix some length function out : N → N, which would be implicit in the discussions below (i.e., we assume that the random oracles are all out -oracles, the relations are evasive with respect to out , etc.).
FIRST STEP
Definition. Let S = (G, S, V ) be a signature scheme (that may or may not use a random oracle), and let R be any binary relation that is evasive with respect to length function out . Then, by S R = (G, S R , V R ) we denote the following modification of S that utilizes a random out -oracle:
Modified signature, S O R (sk, msg) of message msg using signing key sk:
Modified verification, V
O R (vk, msg, σ ),. of alleged signature σ to msg using verification key vk:
The key-generation algorithm, G, is the same as in the original scheme S. Item (1) in the signing/verification algorithms is a harmful modification to the original signature scheme. Yet, if R is evasive, then it has little effect on the ideal system, and the behavior of the modified scheme is "indistinguishable" from the original one. In particular, PROOF. The intuition is that since R is evasive, it is infeasible for the forger to find a message m so that (m, O(m)) ∈ R. Thus, a forgery of the modified scheme must be due to Item (2), contradicting the security of the original scheme.
Formally, let A R be an adversary who mounts an adaptive chosen message attack on S R , and whose success probability in obtaining an existential forgery (in the Random Oracle Model) is frg = frg (k). Assume, toward contradiction, that frg is not negligible in the security parameter k.
Denote by REL the event in which during an execution of A R , it hands out a message m for which (m, O(m)) ∈ R (either as a query to the signer during the chosen message attack, or as the message for which it found a forgery at the end), and let rel = rel (k) be the probability of that event. Using the hypothesis that R is evasive, we now prove that rel is negligible in the security parameter k. Suppose, to the contrary, that rel is not negligible. Then, we can try to efficiently find pairs (x, O(x)) ∈ R by choosing a key-pair for S, and then implementing the attack, playing the role of both the signer algorithm and the adversary A R . With probability rel , one of A R 's messages during this attack satisfies (m, O(m)) ∈ R, so just choosing at random one message that was used and outputting it yields a success probability of rel /q (with q being the number of different messages that are used in the attack). If rel is not negligible, then neither is rel /q, contradicting the evasiveness of R.
It is clear that barring the event REL, the execution of A R against the original scheme S would be identical to its execution against S R . Hence, the probability that A R succeeds in obtaining an existential forgery against S is at least frg − rel . Since rel is negligible, and frg is not, then A R 's probability of obtaining an existential forgery against S is also not negligible, contradicting the assumed security of S.
The modification to S enables to break the modified scheme S R when implemented with a real ensemble F, in the case where R is the relation R F from Proposition 3.4. Indeed, as corollary to Propositions 3. 4 PROOF. When we use an ensemble F to implement the random oracle in the scheme S R , we obtain the following real scheme (which we denote S R = (G , S R , V R )):
Consider now what happens when we use the ensemble F to implement the the scheme S R F (recall the definition of R F from Eq. (2)). Since R F is evasive, then from Proposition 4.1 we infer that the S R F is secure in the Random Oracle Model. However, when we use the ensemble F to implement the scheme, the seed s becomes part of the public verification-key, and hence is known to the adversary. The adversary can simply output the pair (s, ), that will be accepted by V R F as a valid message-signature pair (since (s, f s (s)) ∈ R F ). Hence, the adversary achieves existential forgery (of S R F ) under key-only attack. Alternatively, the adversary can ask the legitimate signer for a signature on s, hence obtaining the secret signing-key (i.e., total forgery).
SECOND STEP.
4.3.1. Enumeration. For this (and the next) subsection we need an enumeration of all efficiently computable function ensembles. Such enumeration is achieved via an enumeration of all polynomial-time algorithms (i.e., candidates for evaluation algorithms of such ensembles). Several standard technicalities arise. First, enumerating all polynomial-time algorithms is problematic since there is no single polynomial that bounds the running time of all these algorithms. Instead, we fix an arbitrary super-polynomial proper complexity function, 13 t : N → N (e.g., t(n) = n log n ), and enumerate all algorithms of running-time bounded by t. The latter is done by enumerating all possible algorithms, and modifying each algorithm by adding a time-out mechanism that terminates the execution in case more than t(|input|) steps are taken. This modification does not effect the polynomial-time 13 Recall that t(n) is a proper complexity function (or time-constructible) if there exists a machine that computes t(n) and works in time O(t(n) ). This technical requirement is needed to ensure that the enumeration itself is computable in time O(t(n) ).
algorithms. Also, since we are interested in enumerating out -ensembles, we modify each function by viewing its seed as a pair s, x (using some standard parsing rule) and padding or truncating its output to length out (|s|). Again, this modification has no effect on the out -ensembles.
Let us denote by F i the ith function ensemble according to the above enumeration, and denote by f 
Universal Relation. Denote by R
U the universal relation that is defined with respect to the universal ensemble U similarly to the way that R F is defined with respect to any ensemble F. That is:
Or, in other words:
Modified Signature Scheme. Let S = (G, S, V ) be a signature scheme (as above). We then denote by S u = (G, S u , V u ) the modified signature scheme that is derived by using R U in place of R in the previous construction. Specifically:
We note that since these signature and verification algorithms need to compute U, they both run in time O(t), which is slightly super-polynomial.
PROPOSITION 4.3. Suppose that S is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack in the Random Oracle Model. Then S u is also existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack in the Random Oracle Model, but implementing it with any function ensemble yields a scheme that is totally breakable under chosen message attack and existentially forgeable under key-only attack.
PROOF. Since R U is evasive, then from Proposition 4.1 it follows that S u is secure in the Random Oracle Model. On the other hand, suppose that one tries to replace the random oracle in the scheme by an ensemble F i (where i be the index in the enumeration). An adversary, given a seed s of a function in F i can then set msg = i, s and output the pair (msg, ), which would be accepted as a valid message-signature pair by V u . Alternatively, it can ask the signer for a signature on this message msg, and so obtain the secret signing-key. 4.4. THIRD STEP. We now use CS-proofs to construct a new signature scheme that works in the Random Oracle Model. This construction is similar to the one in Section 4.3, except that instead of checking that (msg, O(msg)) ∈ R U , the signer/verifier gets a CS-proof of that claim, and it only needs to verify the validity of that proof. Since verifying the validity of a CS-proof can be done much more efficiently than checking the claim "from scratch", the signing and verifications algorithms in the new scheme may work in polynomial time. On the other hand, when the scheme is implemented using the function We note again that unlike the "signature scheme" presented in Section 4.3, the signature scheme presented below works in polynomial-time.
PROOF. Below we describe such a signature scheme. For this construction we use the following ingredients.
-S = (G, S, V ) is a signature scheme, operating in the Random Oracle Model, that is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack. -A fixed (and easily computable) parsing rule that interpret messages as triples of strings msg = i, s, π . -The algorithms PRV and VER of a CS-proof system, as described in Section 2.2 above. -Access to three independent random oracles. This is very easy to achieve given access to one oracle O; specifically, by setting Using all the above, we describe an ideal signature scheme S u = (G, S u , V u ). As usual, the key generation algorithm, G, remains unchanged. The signature and verification algorithms proceed as follows: (2) Apply VER O to verify whether π is a valid CS-proof, with respect to the oracle O and security parameter 1 n+k , for the claim that the machine M U accepts the input (x, y) within time t(n).
(The punch line is that we do not directly check whether the machine M U accepts the input (x, y) within time t(n), but rather only if π is a valid CSproof of this claim. Although t(n) = n log n , this CS-proof can be verified in polynomial time.) (3) If π is a valid proof, then output (sk, msg). (4) Otherwise, output S O (sk, msg).
The computation required in Item (2) of the signature and verification algorithms can be executed in polynomial time. The reason being that (by definition) verifying a CS-proof can be done in polynomial time, provided the statement can be decided in at most exponential time (which is the case here since we have t(n) = O(n log n )). It is also easy to see that for every pair (sk, vk) output by G, and for every msg and every O, the string S u O (sk, msg) constitutes a valid signature of msg relative to vk and the oracle O.
To show that the scheme is secure in the Random Oracle Model, we first observe that on security parameter 1 k it is infeasible to find a string x so that (x, O (x)) ∈ R U , since R U is evasive. By Proposition 2.8, it is also infeasible to find (x, π) such that (x, O (x)) ∈ R U and yet π is a valid CS-proof of the contrary relative to O (with security parameter 1 |x|+ out (k)+k ). Thus, it is infeasible for a polynomial-time adversary to find a message that would pass the test on Item (2) of the signature/verification algorithms above, and so we infer that the modified signature is secure in the Random Oracle Model.
We now show that for every candidate implementation, F, there exists a polynomial-time adversary effecting total break via a chosen message attack (or, analogously, an existential forgery via a "key only" attack). First, for each function Suppose that F is the ith function ensemble in the enumeration mentioned above, namely F = F i . Given a randomly chosen k-bit seed s, the adversary generates a message msg = i, s, π so that π is a CS-proof (with respect to the adequate security parameter) for the true statement that M U accepts the input (x, y) within t(|x| + |y|) steps, where x = i, s and y = f s (x). Recall that the above statement is indeed true (since f s ≡ f i s ), and hence the adversary can generate a proof for it in time which is polynomial in the time that it takes to compute f i s . (By the perfect completeness property of the CS-proof system, the ability to prove correct statements holds for any choice of the random oracle, and in particular when it is equal to f s .) Since this adversary is specifically designed to break the scheme in which the random oracle is implemented by F, then the index i-which depends only on the choice of F-can be incorporated into the program of this adversary.
By the efficiency condition of CS-proofs, it is possible to find π (given an oracle access to f s ) in time polynomial in the time that it takes M U to accept the input (x, y). Since F i is polynomial-time computable, then M U works on the input (x, y) = ( i, s , y) in polynomial time, and thus the described adversary also operates in polynomial-time.
By construction of the modified verification algorithm, is a valid signature on msg = i, s, π , and so existential forgery is feasible a priori. Furthermore, requesting the signer to sign the message msg yields the signing key, and thus total forgery.
Remark 4.5. It is immaterial for the above argument whether CS-proofs can be implemented in the "real world" (i.e., without access to random oracles). Specifically, it does not matter if one can cheat when the oracle is substituted by a candidate function ensemble, as in this case (i.e., in the real world implementation) it is sufficient for the adversary to invoke the proof system on valid statements. We do rely, however, on the perfect completeness of CS-proofs that implies that valid statements can be proven for any possible choice of oracle used in the proof system. PROOF. In this proof, we use the same notations as in the proof of Theorem 4.4. Let E = (G, E, D) be an encryption scheme that is semantically secure in the Random Oracle Model, and we modify it to get another scheme E = (G, E , D ) . The key generation algorithm remains unchanged, and the encryption and decryption algorithms utilize a random oracle O, which is again viewed as three oracles O , O and O .
Modified Encryption, E ek
O (msg), of plaintext msg using the public encryptionkey ek:
(1) Parse msg as i, s, π , set x = i, s and y = O (x), and let n = |(x, y)|.
(2) If π is a valid CS-proof, with respect to oracle O and security parameter 1 n+k , for the assertion that M U accepts the pair (x, y) within t(n) steps, then output (1, msg). The efficiency of this scheme follows as before. It is also easy to see that for every pair (ek, dk) output by G, and for every plaintext msg, the equality
To show that the scheme is secure in the Random Oracle Model, we observe again that it is infeasible to find a plaintext that satisfies the condition in Item (2) of the encryption algorithm (respectively, a ciphertext that satisfies the condition in Item (3) of the decryption algorithm). Thus, the modified ideal encryption scheme (in the Random Oracle Model) inherits all security features of the original scheme.
Similarly, to show that replacing the random oracle by any function ensemble yields an insecure scheme, we again observe that for any such ensemble there exists an adversary who-given the seed s-can generate a plaintext msg that satisfies the condition in Item (2) of the encryption algorithm. Hence, such an adversary can identify when msg is being encrypted (thus violates semantic security). This proves Part (a) of the theorem. For Part (b), the adversary generates a ciphertext c that meets the condition in Item (3) of the decryption algorithm, and ask for a decryption of c, thus obtaining the secret decryption key. Remark 4.7. As opposed to Theorem 4.4, here we need to make computational assumptions, namely, that there exist schemes that are secure in the Random Oracle Model. (The results of Impagliazzo and Rudich [1989] imply that it is unlikely that such schemes are proven to exist without making any assumptions.) Clearly, any scheme that is secure without random oracles is also secure in the Random Oracle Model. Recall that the former exist, provided trapdoor permutations exist [Yao 1982; Goldwasser and Micali 1984] .
Remark 4.8. The constructions presented above can be adapted to yield many analogous results. For example, a result analogous to Theorem 4.6 holds for shared-key (aka private-key) encryption schemes. In this case, no computational assumptions are needed since secure shared-key encryption is known to exist in the Random Oracle Model. Similarly, we can prove the existence of a CS-proof in the Random Oracle Model that has no implementations (via any function ensemble). In fact, as remarked in the Introduction, the same technique can be applied to practically any cryptographic application.
Restricted Ensembles and Other Directions
Faced with the negative result of Theorem 3.4, one may explore restricted (and yet possibly useful) versions of "an implementation of a random oracle". One possibility is to put more stringent constraints on the use of the ensemble in a cryptographic scheme, and then to show that as long as the ensemble is only used in this restricted manner, it is guaranteed to maintain some aspects of correlation intractability.
In particular, notice that the proof of Theorem 3.4 relies heavily on the fact that the input to f s can be as long as the seed s.
17 Thus, one option would be to require that f s be used only on inputs that are shorter than s. Specifically, require that each function f s will only be applied to inputs of length in (|s|), where in : N → N is some prespecified function (e.g., in (k) = k/2). This leads to the corresponding restricted notion of correlation intractability (which is derived from Definition 3.2):
* .
-A binary relation R is evasive with respect to ( in , out ) if for any in -respecting probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machine M 
Weak in -correlation intractability is defined analogously by considering only polynomial-time recognizable R's.
Most of this section is dedicated to demonstrating impossibility results for restricted correlation intractable ensembles, in some cases. We also highlight cases where existence of restricted correlation intractable ensembles is left as an open problem.
17
In fact, the said proof uses an input to f s (specifically s itself) that is of the same length as the seed. 
PROOF. The proof of (a) is a straightforward generalization of the proof of Theorem 3.4. Actually, we need to consider two cases: the case in (k) ≥ k and the case k − O(log k) ≤ in (k) < k. In the first case, we proceed as in the proof of Theorem 3.4 (except that we define R
In the second case, for every ensemble F, we define the relation
We show that R F is evasive by showing that, for every k ∈ N and x ∈ {0, 1} in (k) , there exist at most polynomially (in k) many y's such that (x, y) ∈ R F . This is the case since (x, y) ∈ R F implies that there exists some z such that in (|xz|) = |x| and y = f xz (x). But using the case hypothesis, we have |x| = in (|xz|) ≥ |xz| − O(log |xz|), implying that |z| = O(log(|xz|)) and hence also |z| = O(log |x|). Next, using the other case hypothesis (i.e., k > in (k) = |x|), we conclude that |z| = O(log k). Therefore, there could be at most polynomially many such z's, and so the upper bound on the number of y's paired with x follows. The evasiveness of R F as well as the assertion that R F is polynomial-time computable follow (assuming that the function in itself is polynomial-time computable). On the other hand, consider the machine M that, on input s, outputs the in (|s|)-bit prefix of s. Then, for every s ∈ {0, 1} * , we have (
For the proof of (b), assume that in (k) < k (for all but finitely many k's). We start by defining the "inverse" of the in function
(where, in case there exists no k such that in (k) = n, we define
, for all k's (because k belongs to the set {k : in (k ) = in (k)}), and that in ( −1 in (n)) = n, whenever there exists some k for which n = in (k). Next we define
in (|x|)} This relation is well defined since, by the conditions on the lengths of x and z, we have in (|xz|) = in ( −1 in (|x|)) = |x| and so the function f xz is indeed defined on the input x. In case in (k) ≤ k − ω(log k), this relation may not be polynomialtime recognizable. Still, it is evasive with respect to ( in , out ), since with security parameter k we have for every x ∈ {0, 1}
, we conclude that the set of y's paired with x forms a negligible fraction of {0, 1} out (k) , and so that R F is evasive. Again, the machine M, that on input s outputs the in (|s|)-bit prefix of s, satisfies (M(s), f s (M(s))) ∈ R F , for all s's. 
. 18 We believe that it is interesting to resolve the situation either way: Either provide negative results also for the above special case, or provide a plausible construction. Also open is the subcase where in (k) + out (k) = k + ω(log k) but one considers only weak ( in , out )-restricted correlation intractability. (Recall that Case (b) of Proposition 5.2 is proven using relations that are not known to be polynomial-time recognizable.) 5.2. OTHER LIMITATIONS OF RESTRICTED CORRELATION INTRACTABLE ENSEM-BLES. Proposition 5.2 does not rule out the existence of correlation intractable ensembles having sufficiently long seed. This section demonstrates that even if such ensembles exist, then they are very nonrobust constructs. Specifically, even if the ensemble F = { f s : |s| = k} k is restricted correlation intractable with respect to some length functions ( in , out ), the ensemble that is obtained by applying many independent copies of F and concatenating the results may not be. That is, for m : N → N, define
where, for
Then, for sufficiently large m (e.g., m(k) ≥ k/ in (k) will do), the "direct product" ensemble F m is not correlation intractable (not even in the restricted sense). That is, 
PROOF. We assume, for simplicity that m(k) = k/ in (k) (and so in 
m as stated, we again adapt the proof of Theorem 3.4. This time, using in (k) ≤ k, we define the relation
Notice that in this definition we have |s| =
Again, it is easy to see that R F is polynomial-time recognizable, and it is evasive since every string x ∈ {0, 1} k is coupled with at most a 2 − out (k) fraction of the possible (m(k) · out (k))-bit long strings, and out 
(Here, we use the hypothesis m(k) = poly(k).)
On the other hand, consider a (real-life) adversary that given the seed ,s m(k) , sets the input to this function to be equal to s 1 . Denoting the in (k)-prefix of s 1 (equivalently, of s) by s 1 , it follows that f s 1 (s 1 ) is a prefix of f s 1 ,...,s m(k) (s 1 ) and so (s 1 , f s 1 ,...,s m(k) (s 1 )) ∈ R F . Thus, this real-life adversary violates the (restricted) correlation intractability of F m .
ON CORRELATION INTRACTABILITY FOR MULTIPLE INVOCATIONS.
Proposition 5.2 relates only to forming rare relationships between a single input-output pair. This section demonstrates that, if one generalizes the definition of correlation intractability to consider also evasive relations over long sequences of inputs and outputs, then the negative result in Proposition 5.2 can be extended for arbitrary in and out . That is:
Definition 5.4 (Multiple-Input Restricted Correlation Intractability). Let in , out : N → N be length functions. We consider probabilistic polynomial-time oracle machines that on input 1 k have oracle access to a function O : {0, 1} in (k) → {0, 1} out (k) .
-A relation R over pairs of binary sequences is evasive with respect to ( in , out ) (or ( in , out )-evasive) if for any probabilistic polynomial-time machine M as above, there exists a negligible function negl such that
is a uniformly chosen function. -We say that an out -ensemble F is ( in , out )-restricted multiple-input correlation intractable if for every ( in , out )-evasive relation R and every probabilistic polynomial-time machine M, there exists a negligible function negl such that PROOF. For simplicity, we consider first the case out (k) ≥ 2. Let F be an out -ensemble. Adapting the proof of Theorem 3.4, we define the relation ((x 1 , . . . , x k ), ( f s (x 1 ), . . . , f s (x k )) ) :
x i = (i, s i ), with s i ∈ {0, 1} and s = s 1 . . . s k .
(5) (Notice that since in (k) > 1 + log k, the x i 's are indeed in the range of the function f s .) Clearly, this relation is polynomial-time recognizable. To see that this relation is evasive, notice that for any fixed k-bit seed s = s 1 · · · s k , we have
Hence, the probability that there exists a seed s for which O(i,
However, the corresponding multiple-input restricted correlation intractability condition does not hold:
IMPLICATIONS FOR SIGNATURES AND ENCRYPTION.
The results from Section 5.3 can be used to extend the negative results from Theorems 4.4 and 4.6 also to the case of restricted ensembles with short seeds. These theorems and proofs are very similar to the ones from Section 4. Here, we only state the theorem for signatures and provide a proof sketch. THEOREM 5.6. There exists a signature scheme that is existentially unforgeable under a chosen message attack in the Random Oracle Model, but such that when implemented with any restricted function ensemble with in (k) ≥ log k + ω(1), the resulting scheme is existentially forgeable using key-only attack and totally breakable under chosen message attack. PROOF SKETCH. Fix some length functions ( in , out ), with in (k) ≥ log k + ω(1) (and assume, for simplicity, that out (k) ≥ 2). We follow the same three steps as in the proof of Theorem 4.4, with the following modifications: For the first step, the message to be signed is parsed as a vector x = x 1 . . . x n (with |x i | = in (k) when the security parameter is k) and the signer checks whether the sequence (
For the second step, we again use enumeration of ensembles (this time, however, we enumerate ( in , out )-restricted ensembles). The "universal ensemble" that we need can be defined as
x j = ( j, y j ), where y j ∈ {0, 1}, and for j = 1, . . . , m, y j is the jth bit of i for j = 1, . . . , k, y m+ j is the jth bit of s , where i is the encoding of the ith ensemble, F i . Note that since in (k) ≥ log k + ω(1), then for each fixed i, the input length will conform to the length restriction eventually (i.e., for a large enough security parameter). The third step uses CSproofs, just as in the proof of Theorem 4.4.
ON WEAK RESTRICTED CORRELATION-INTRACTABLE ENSEMBLES.
In all our negative results, the evasive relation demonstrating that a certain function ensemble is not correlation-intractable is more complex than the function ensemble itself. A natural restriction on correlation-intractability is to require that it holds only for relations recognizable within certain fixed polynomial-time bounds (or some fixed space bound), and allowing the function ensemble to have a more complex polynomial-time evaluation algorithm. We stress that, in both the definition of evasiveness and correlation-intractability, the adversary that generates the inputs to the relation is allowed arbitrary (polynomial) running time; this time may be larger than both the time to evaluate the function ensemble and the time to evaluate the relation. Such a restricted notion of correlation-intractability may suffice for some applications, and it would be interesting to determine whether function ensembles satisfying it do exist. Partial results in this direction were obtained by Nissim [1999] and are described next: PROPOSITION 5.7 (NISSIM 1999) . Let in , out : N → N be arbitrary length functions, with k 
We note that the postulated construction uses a seed length that is longer than in + out . Thus, this positive result capitalizes on both restrictions discussed above (i.e., both the length and the complexity restrictions). Let R(x) def = {y : (x, y) ∈ R}, and S k def = {x ∈ {0, 1} in (k) : |R(x)| ≤ 2 out (k) /2} (S stands for "Small image"). Since R is evasive, it is infeasible to find an x ∈ {0, 1} in (k) not in S k . Thus, for every probabilistic polynomial-time M,
On the other hand, the probability that such M(s) outputs an x ∈ S k so that (x, f s (x)) ∈ R is bounded above by
Combining the two cases, the proposition follows. 19 Recall that ( in , out )-restricted correlation-intractable ensembles exist for k ≥ 2 in (k) · out (k); see Footnote 18. 20 For the first inequality, we use the fact that if there exists an i such that (x,
Considering the notion of multiple-input correlation-intractability when restricting the complexity of the relation (and allowing the function ensemble to be more complex), Nissim [1999] 
Furthermore, for some universal polynomial p, which is independent of F, it holds that t < p(|x 1 |).
We stress that the above assertion includes even function ensembles that have (polynomial-time) evaluation algorithms of running time greater than the time it takes to recognize t-tuples of corresponding length in the relation. Furthermore, it includes function ensembles having seeds of length exceeding the total length of pairs in the relation.
PROOF SKETCH. We follow the ideas underlying the proof of Theorem 4.4. Specifically, using the universal machine M U and the algorithms (PRV and VER) of a CS-proof system, we consider a relation R that contains pairs of binary sequences, so that ((x, π, q 1 , . . . , q m ), (y, φ, a 1 , . . . , a m )) ∈ R if these strings describe an accepting execution of the CS-verifier with respect to machine M U . That is, we require that the following conditions hold:
(1) All the strings y, φ, a 1 . . . , a m have the same length. 21 Below we denote this length by out , |y| = |φ| = |a 1 | = · · · = |a m | = out .
(2) The string π is an alleged CS-proof for the assertion that the machine M U accepts the input (x, y) within t(n) = n log n steps, where n def = |x| + |y|. (3) Given access to an oracle that on queries q i returns answers a i , and given security parameter n + out and input w = ( M U , (x, y), t(n)), the CS verifier VER accepts the CS-proof π after querying the oracle on q 1 · · · q m (in this order), and obtaining the corresponding answers a 1 · · · a m .
(Here we use the fact that the verifier is deterministic, and thus its queries are determined by its input and the answers to previous queries.)
Recall that, by definition, m is bounded by a fixed polynomial in n. In fact, in the construction presented in Micali [2000] , m is poly-logarithmic in n. We comment that, assuming the existence of suitable collision-intractable hash functions, one may obtain m = 1 (cf. Naor and Nissim [1999] ). In addition, one may need to make some minor modification in the above construction.)
As in the proof of Theorem 4.4, using the computational soundness of CSproofs, it can be shown that the above relation is evasive. By the additional efficiency conditions of CS-proofs, it follows that the relation is recognizable in polynomial time. On the other hand, as in the proof of is indeed accepted by M U (in less than n log n steps), the verifier accept π as a proof no matter how the oracle is determined (since perfect completeness holds). Finally, the adversary invokes the verifier (on input consisting mainly of (x, y) and π), and (by emulating the oracle) determines interactively the oracle queries and answers of the verifier; that is, for every j = 1, . . . , m, the adversary determines the jth query made by the verifier, sets q j to equal this query, and provides the verifier with the answer f i s (q j ).
5.6. ON THE FAILURE OF SOME SPECIfiC CONSTRUCTIONS. We conclude our study of restricted correlation-intractable by pointing out the failure of several natural candidates, even in the restricted case of single-invocation.
5.6.1. Pseudorandom Function Ensembles. A natural conjecture is that pseudorandom functions, as defined in Goldreich et al. [1986] , may yield at least some restricted form of correlation-intractability. However, it is easy to see that this conjecture fails miserably. For example, for any (super-logarithmic) 
x is a prefix of s, and f s (x) = f s (x) otherwise, yields a pseudorandom function ensemble that is clearly not correlation-intractability (even in the restricted case of single-invocation). 22 We mention that even the pseudorandom function ensembles that results from the construction of Goldreich et al. [1986] are not necessarily correlation-intractable. Specifically, one can construct a pseudorandom generator such that applying to it the construction from Goldreich et al. [1986] results in a pseudorandom function ensemble, in which given the seed one can efficiently find an input that is mapped to the all-zero string [Goldreich 2002 ]. We stress that this holds for any in (k) = out (k) = ω(log k).
Universal and Higher Independence Hash Functions.
Finally, we point out that, in general, collections of t-wise independent hashing functions are not correlation-intractable (even in a restricted sense). For example, consider the collection of t-wise independent hash functions derived from the set of degree t − 1 polynomials over GF(2 n ). Specifically, for each such (degree t − 1) polynomial p : GF(2 n ) → GF(2 n ), consider the function f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n/2 that results by letting f (x) be the n/2-bit prefix of p(x). Note that this collection has seed length t · n, which is much larger than the sum of the lengths of the input and output (i.e., n + (n/2)). Still, given the description of such a function (i.e., the polynomial p) it is easy to find an input that is mapped to 0 n/2 (e.g., by selecting uniformly r ∈ {0, 1} n/2 and finding a root of the polynomial p(x) − α, where α = 0 n/2 r ).
Conclusions
The results in this work show conclusively that the random oracle methodology is not sound, in general, with respect to the natural notions of "implementation of the random oracle." Although these negative results seem to have no effect on the security of common practical schemes that were built using this methodology, it should serve as a warning sign. At the same time, one can view these results as a challenge: Is it possible to find a "reasonable notion of implementation", relative to which one can show the soundness of this methodology (at least, in some interesting cases)? The work of Canetti [1997] is a first step in that direction, but more steps seem to be called for. In particular, one could consider a more general notion of "implementation", as a compiler that takes a scheme that works in the Random Oracle Model and produces a scheme that works in the standard model (i.e., without a random oracle). This compiler may do more than just replace the oracle queries by function calls. However, such a general-purpose compiler is ruled out by Nielsen's recent work [Nielsen 2002 ], which shows that there are (natural) cryptographic tasks that can be securely realized in the Random Oracle Model but cannot be securely realized in the standard model. Thus, one should focus on special-purpose compilers (i.e., compilers that can be applied only to restricted classes of schemes and/or tasks). Furthermore, the compiler should preserve the complexity of the original Random Oracle Model scheme (as done by the straightforward compiler that just replaces the oracle queries by function calls).
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Regarding the implications of our results to the current practice of the Random Oracle Methodology, the authors have different opinions. Rather than trying to strike a mild compromise, we prefer to present our disagreements in the most controversial form. 6.1. RAN'S CONCLUSIONS. Real-life cryptographic applications are complex objects. On top of the "cryptographic core," these applications typically involve numerous networking protocols, several other applications, user-interfaces, and in fact also an entire operating-system. The security of an application depends on the security of all these components operating in unison. Thus, in principle, the best way to gain assurance in the security of a cryptographic application is to analyze it as a single unit, bones and feathers included.
However, analyzing an entire system is prohibitively complex. Moreover, we often feel that the "essence" of a cryptographic application can be presented in a relatively simple way without getting into many details that, we feel, are "extraneous" to the actual security. Consequently, we often make abstractions of a cryptographic application by leaving many details "outside the model". Such abstractions are indeed essential tools in protocol analysis. Nonetheless, great caution is needed when making abstractions: While sound abstractions are important and useful, unsound abstractions can be dangerous and misleading. Thus, it is crucial to make sure that one uses a sound abstraction, namely one that helps us distinguish between good and bad applications.
One popular abstraction is to treat computers in a network as interactive Turing machines who run one specific (and relatively simple) algorithm, and assume that delivery of messages is done simply by having one machine write values on the tapes of another machine. We are then satisfied with defining and analyzing security of a protocol in this abstract model. In other words, this abstraction implicitly uses the following methodology (which I'll call the "Interactive Turing machine methodology"): Design and analyze a protocol in the "idealized system" (i.e., using Turing machines). Next, come up with an "implementation" of the idealized protocol by adding the components that deal with the networking protocols, the operating system, the user interfaces, etc. Now, "hope" that the implementation is indeed secure.
We widely believe that this methodology is sound, in the sense that if an idealized protocol is secure then there exist secure implementations of it. Furthermore, security of an idealized protocol is a good predictor for the feasibility of finding a good implementation to it. (Of course, finding secure implementations to secure idealized protocols is a far-from-trivial task, and there is probably no single automatic method for securely implementing any idealized protocol. But this does not undermine the soundness of the "Interactive Turing machine methodology".)
The Random Oracle methodology is, in essence, another proposed abstraction of cryptographic applications. It too proposes to define and analyze security of protocols in an idealized model, then perform some transformation that is "outside the formal model", and now "hope" that the resulting implementation is secure. At first, it looks like a great abstraction: It does away with specific implementation issues of "cryptographic hash functions" and concentrates on designing protocols assuming that an "ideal hash function" is available. Indeed, many protocols that were designed using this methodology are remarkably simple and efficient, while resisting all known attacks.
However, as shown in this work, and in sharp contrast to the "Interactive Turing machine methodology," the Random Oracle Methodology is not sound. Furthermore, it is a bad predictor to the security of implementations: Not only do there exist idealized protocols that have no secure implementations, the methods described in this work can be used to turn practically any idealized protocol described in the literature into a protocol that remains just as secure in the idealized model, but has no secure implementations. This leaves us no choice but concluding that, in spite of its apparent successes, the Random Oracle model is a bad abstraction of protocols for the purpose of analyzing security. 6.1.1. The Loss of Reductions to Hard Problems. The above discussion should provide sufficient motivation to be wary of security analyses in the Random Oracle Model. Nonetheless, let me highlight the following additional disturbing aspect of such analysis.
One of the great contributions of complexity-based modern cryptography, developed in the past quarter of a century, is the ability to base the security of many varied protocols on a small number of well-defined and well-studied complexity assumptions. Furthermore, typically the proof of security of a protocol provides us with a method for transforming adversary that breaks the security of the said protocol into an adversary that refutes one of the well-studied assumptions. In light of our inability to prove security of protocols from scratch, this methodology provides us with the "next best" evidence for the security of protocols.
The Random Oracle Methodology does away with these advantages. Assume that an idealized protocol A is proven secure in the Random Oracle Model based on, say, the Diffie-Hellman assumption, and that someone comes up with a way to break any implementation of A. This does not necessarily mean that it is now possible to break Diffie-Hellman! Consequently, the reducibility of the security of A to the hardness of Diffie-Hellman is void. This brings us back to a situation where the security of each protocol is a "stand-alone" conjecture and is, in essence, unrelated to the hardness of known problems. 6.1.2. Possible Alternative Directions. In spite of its shortcomings, the Random Oracle Methodology seems to generate simple and efficient protocols against which no attacks are known. Consequently, the Random oracle model can be regarded as a good initial idealized setting for designing and analyzing protocols. Still, it must be kept in mind that analysis in the random oracle model is only a first step towards meaningful security analysis. It does not, by itself, provide any security guarantees for the implementations in the standard model.
One possible direction towards providing formal justification for some of the protocols constructed using the Random Oracle methodology, is to identify useful, special-purpose properties of the random oracle, which can be also provided by a fully specified function (or function ensemble) and so yield secure implementations of certain useful ideal systems. First steps in this direction were taken in Canetti [1997] , Canetti et al. [1998b] , and Gennaro et al. [1999] . Hopefully, future works will push this direction further. 6.2. ODED'S CONCLUSIONS. My starting point is that within the domain of science, every deduction requires a rigorous justification. 24 In contrast, unjustified deductions should not be allowed; especially not in a subtle research area such as Cryptography. Furthermore, one should refrain from making statements that are likely to mislead the listener/reader, such as claiming a result in a restricted model while creating the impression that it holds also in a less restricted model. The presentation of such a result should clearly state the restrictions under which it holds, and refrain from creating the impression that the result extends also to a case where these restrictions are waived (unless this is indeed true (and one can prove it)). Needless to say, it is perfectly OK to conjecture that a restricted result extends also to a case when these restrictions are waived, but the stature of such a statement (as a conjecture) should be clear.
The above abstract discussion directly applies to security in the Random Oracle Model. Deducing that the security of a scheme in the Random Oracle Model means anything about the security of its implementations, without proper justification, is clearly wrong. This should have been clear also before the current work. It should have also been clear that no proper justification of a deduction from security in the Random Oracle Model to security of implementations has ever been given. The contributions of the current work are two-fold:
(1) This work uncovers inherent difficulties in the project of providing conditions that would allow (justifiable) deduction from security in the Random Oracle
Model to security of implementations. Such a project could have proceeded by identifying properties that characterize proofs of security in the Random Oracle Model, and (justifiably) deducing that the such schemes maintain their security when implemented with ensembles satisfying these properties. The problem with this project is that correlation intractability should have been (at the very least) one of these properties, but (as we show) no function ensemble can satisfy it.
(2) As stated above, deducing that the security of a scheme in the Random Oracle Model means anything about the security of its implementations, without proper justification, is clearly wrong. The current work presents concrete examples in which this unjustified deduction leads to wrong conclusions. That is, it is shown that not only that unjustified deduction regarding the Random Oracle Model MAY lead to wrong conclusions, but rather than in some cases INDEED this unjustified deduction DOES lead to wrong conclusions. Put in other words, if one needs a concrete demonstration of the dangers of unjustified deduction when applied to the Random Oracle Model, then this work provides it.
The Bottom-Line. It should be clear that the Random Oracle Methodology is not sound; that is, the mere fact that a scheme is secure in the Random Oracle Model cannot be taken as evidence (or indication) to the security of (possible) implementations of this scheme. Does this mean that the Random Oracle Model is useless? Not necessarily: it may be useful as a test-bed (or as a sanity check).
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Indeed, if the scheme does not perform well on the test-bed (respectively, fails the sanity check) then it should be dumped. But one should not draw wrong conclusions from the mere fact that a scheme performs well on the test-bed (respectively, passes the sanity check). In summary, the Random Oracle Methodology is actually a method for ruling out some insecure designs, but this method is not "complete" (i.e., it may fail to rule out insecure designs). 26 6.3. SHAI'S CONCLUSIONS. The negative results in this work (and, in particular, Theorems 4.4 and 4.6) leave me with an uneasy feeling: adopting the view that a good theory should be able to explain "the real world", I would have liked theoretical results that explain the apparent success of the random oracle methodology in devising useful, seemingly secure, cryptographic schemes. (Indeed, this was one of the original motivations for this work.) Instead, in this work we show that security of cryptographic schemes in the Random Oracle Model does not necessarily imply security in "the real world". Trying to resolve this apparent mismatch, one may come up with several different explanations. Some of those are discussed below:
-The current success of this methodology is due to pure luck: All the current schemes that are proven secure in the Random Oracle Model, happen to be secure also in the "real world" for no reason. However, our "common sense" and sense of aesthetics must lead us to reject such explanation. -The current apparent success is a mirage: Some of the schemes that are proven secure in the Random Oracle Model are not really secure, and attacks on them may be discovered in the future. This explanation seems a little more attractive than the previous one. After all, a security proof in the Random Oracle Model eliminates a broad class of potential attacks (i.e., the ones that would work also in the Random Oracle Model), and in many cases it seems that attacks of this type are usually the ones that are easier to find. Hence, it makes sense that if there exists a "real life" attack on a scheme that is secure in the Random Oracle Model, it may be harder-and take longer-to find this attack.
-Another possible explanation is that the random oracle methodology works for the current published schemes, due to some specific features of these schemes that we are yet to identify. That is, maybe it is possible to identify interesting classes of schemes, for which security in the Random Oracle Model implies the existence of a secure implementation.
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Identifying such interesting classes, and proving the above implication, is an important-and seemingly hard-research direction. (In fact, it even seems to be hard to identify classes of schemes for which this implication makes a reasonable conjecture.)
As we illustrate in the introduction, we could attribute the "mismatch" between the apparent security of the practical schemes that were devised using the random oracle methodology and the (proven) insecurity of our contrived schemes, to our current lack of knowledge regarding "what can be done with a code of a function". One can hope that improving the understanding of this point could shed light also on the relations between the security of ideal schemes and their implementations (i.e., let us either find new types of attacks, as per the second point above, or identify cases where attacks are infeasible, as per the third point).
For now, however, I view the random oracle methodology as a very useful "engineering tool" for devising schemes. As a practical matter, I would much rather see today's standards built around schemes that are proven secure in the Random Oracle Model, than around schemes for which no such proofs exist. If nothing else, it makes finding attacks on such schemes a whole lot harder.
